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Challenges in the Enforcement of Animal Protection Laws in Singapore 
 
Alvin W-L See* 
 
Introduction 
 
Singapore has fairly powerful animal protection laws. In practice, however, these laws 
are only powerful to the extent that they are actually enforced. In Singapore, the low 
number of prosecutions for animal cruelty is a cause for serious concern. While there 
can be a myriad of reasons for this phenomenon, this paper argues that one primary 
cause is the insufficient understanding of what amounts, or may amount, to cruelty at 
law. This results in an unsound enforcement policy which reduces the protection 
afforded to animals. By highlighting this problem, this paper hopes to draw attention to 
the importance of the study and development of animal law, which has a direct impact 
on the extent to which animals are actually protected. 
The following discussions will proceed in six parts. Part 1 provides a brief 
description of the animal protection laws of Singapore. Part 2 looks at the available 
enforcement statistics and identifies potential problems with the existing prosecution 
policy. To better illustrate these problems, Parts 3 and 4 examine a number of recent 
cases that presently attract public concern and discuss whether the laws applicable to 
these cases were properly understood by the enforcement agency. Part 5 explains the 
relevance of public opinion in determining issues of animal cruelty. Lastly, Part 6 
stresses the importance of utilising the prosecution mechanism as a means to obtain 
judicial clarification of the law. 
 
Part 1: Animal protection laws of Singapore1 
 
The main source of animal protection laws in Singapore is section 42(1) of the 
Animals and Birds Act of 1970 (hereinafter ABA),2 which sets out a list of cruelty 
offences: 
 
(1)  Any person who — 
(a) cruelly beats, kicks, ill-treats, over-rides, over-drives, over-loads, 
tortures, infuriates or terrifies any animal; 
                                                
* Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. This is a modified version of a paper 
presented at the ‘2014 International Conference on Animal Liberation, Animal Rights, and Equal 
Ecological Rights: Dialogues between Eastern and Western Philosophies and Religion’, which took 
place on 26–27 April 2014 at Hsuan Chuang University, Taiwan. I am grateful to the organisers for the 
opportunity to present at the conference and their excellent hospitality during my stay in Taiwan. 
1 For a detailed analysis of the offences, see Alvin W-L See, “Animal Protection Laws of Singapore and 
Malaysia” [2013] SJLS 125. 
2 (Singapore, cap 7, 2002 rev ed). 
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(b) causes or procures or, being the owner, permits any animal to be so 
used; 
(c) being in charge of any animal in confinement or in the course of 
transport from one place to another neglects to supply the animal with 
sufficient food and water; 
(d) by wantonly or unreasonably doing or omitting to do any act, causes 
any unnecessary pain or suffering or, being the owner, permits any 
unnecessary pain or suffering to any animal; 
(e) causes, procures or, being the owner, permits to be confined, conveyed, 
lifted or carried any animal in such a manner or position as to subject it 
to unnecessary pain or suffering; 
(f) being the owner of any animal, abandons the animal without reasonable 
cause or excuse, whether permanently or not, in circumstances likely to 
cause the animal any unnecessary suffering or distress, or causes or 
permits the animal to be so abandoned; 
(g) employs or causes or procures or, being the owner, permits to be 
employed in any work of labour, any animal which in consequence of 
any disease, infirmity, wound or sore, or otherwise is unfit to be so 
employed; or 
(h) causes, procures or assists at the fighting or baiting of any animal, or 
keeps, uses, manages, or acts or assists in the management of any 
premises or place for the purpose, or partly for the purpose, of fighting 
or baiting any animal, or permits any premises or place to be so kept, 
managed or used, or receives or causes or procures any person to 
receive money for the admission of any person to the premises or place, 
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not 
exceeding $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months 
or to both ... 
 
The messy structure of section 42(1) reflects the piecemeal development of this area of 
the law in Singapore, which drew heavily from early English animal protection 
legislations.3 However, despite the antiquity of these anti-cruelty provisions, they are 
capable of dealing with a broad range of cruelty conducts. The most important 
offences are clearly (a) and (d) (‘general offences’) due to their broad wordings. The 
rest could be seen as subsets of the two general offences, applying where the 
specifically contemplated cruelties have occurred.  
Despite their varied wordings, most of these offences are essentially 
underpinned by the concept of unnecessary suffering.4 This imports a test of objective 
                                                
3 See especially Protection of Animals Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo 5, c 27.  
4 In the case of s 42(1)(a) of the ABA, the word ‘cruelly’ is to be interpreted as the causing of 
unnecessary suffering. For this interpretation of the same word in s 2 of the Cruelty to Animals Act 
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reasonableness, relying on a hypothetical reasonable person to supply the acceptable 
standard of conduct.5  In simple words, and to state in very general terms, cruelty at 
law is established if such a reasonable person who puts himself in the defendant’s 
position would not have acted as the defendant had. More shall be said later about the 
significance of this test. 
 Besides the ABA, the Penal Code (hereinafter PC) also makes it an offence to 
kill, maim, poison, or render useless any animal.6 Section 428 states: 
 
Whoever commits mischief by killing, poisoning, maiming or rendering 
useless, any animal shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to 5 years, or with fine, or with both. 
 
Although this offence appears to be stated in absolute terms, exceptions could be 
found in the PC itself as well as in other legislations. More shall be said about these 
exceptions in Part 5. 
While it is often said that the purpose of the animal protection laws of Singapore 
is to prevent cruelty to animals, prevention is achieved only indirectly through the 
deterrence effect of punishments meted out to cruelty perpetrators.  Because 
unnecessary suffering is a legal requirement (either explicitly or implicitly), the 
mechanism for legal protection is only triggered after the animal has already suffered 
from cruelty.7 Most modern jurisdictions have gone a step further in an effort to 
improve the welfare of animals. For example, the UK’s Animal Welfare Act 2006 
imposes a positive duty on a person responsible for an animal to ‘take such steps as are 
reasonable in all the circumstances to ensure that the needs of [the] animal… are met 
to the extent required by good practice’.8 Since this provision could be triggered 
without the need to prove that an animal has unnecessarily suffered, it would allow 
enforcement actions to be taken to prevent any suffering that may, or is destined to, 
occur.  
Singapore, of course, would not allow itself to be left behind. After a rather 
comprehensive survey, on 1 March 2013, the Animal Welfare Legislation Review 
Committee made a number of recommendations to improve the welfare of animals in 
Singapore, which includes the adding of a welfare provision into the ABA to impose a 
duty of care on persons in charge of animals to meet the needs of those animals.9 This 
                                                                                                                                        
1849, 12 & 13 Vic, c 92, see Ford v Wiley  (1899) LR 23 QBD 203; Budge v Parsons  (1863) 122 ER 
145; Bowyer v Morgan (1906) 70 JP 253; Barnard v Evans [1925] 2 KB 794. 
5 See, above n 2, 139, 141–43. 
6 (Singapore, cap 224, 2008 rev ed). 
7 An exception is the offence of abandonment under s 42(1)(f) of the ABA, which requires only proof 
that the act of abandonment is likely to cause unnecessary suffering or distress to the animal. 
8 Animal Welfare Act 2006 (UK) c 45, s 9. 
9 Animal Welfare Legislation Reform Committee, ‘Recommendations from Animal Welfare Legislation 
Review Committee’ (Law Reform Recommendation, 1 March 2013)  
<http://www.mnd.gov.sg/AWLRCreport/#/1/>. 
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recommendation has been accepted by the Ministry of National Development and is 
likely to become law in the second half of 2014. 
 
Part 2: Enforcement efforts 
 
Having strong animal protection laws does not guarantee the successful protection of 
animals. Like Singapore, many other former British colonies have inherited relatively 
strong animal protection laws. But there are notorious examples of these laws being 
ignored for a myriad of reasons.10 The question is how does Singapore, which is often 
touted as having one the most efficient legal and enforcement systems in the world, 
fare in this regard? 
 The government agency in charge of enforcing animal protection laws is the 
Agri-Food & Veterinary Authority (AVA).  Established on 1 April 2000, one of its 
objectives is to promote and regulate the welfare of animals.11 Another institution 
having an important role to play in the enforcement efforts is the Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Singapore (SPCA). However, having no formal 
power to prosecute, the SPCA’s function is mainly to persuade the AVA to prosecute 
and to supply relevant data for the purposes of investigation and prosecution. Although 
the AVA and the SPCA have worked closely in combating animal cruelty, there were 
many instances where the two could not come to agreement in terms of enforcement 
policies.  
Since the AVA’s inception, there have only been about 37 successful 
prosecutions for animal cruelty.12 On average this is less than 3 prosecutions per 
year.13 In comparison, the SPCA received and investigated about 1800 cases between 
2011 and 2013 alone.14 Several of these cases were considered to be serious enough to 
warrant prosecutions. To understand the reason behind the AVA’s seemingly passive 
stance, it is necessary to look past mere numbers and examine closely the kind of cases 
that the AVA is reluctant to prosecute. Out of the reported convictions, 30 cases 
involved blatant acts of cruelty such as abuse and killing. Only 7 cases were concerned 
with animals neglected by their owners. In most of these cases the neglected animals 
                                                
10 See Neil Trent, Stephanie Edwards, Jennifer Felt, and Kelly O’Meara, ‘International Animal Law, 
with a Concentration on Latin America, Asia, and Africa’ in Deborah J Salem and Andrew N Rowan 
(ed), The State of Animals III (Human Society Press, 2005) ch 6; Bruce A Wagman and Matthew 
Liebman, A World View of Animal Law (Carolina Academic Press, 2011).  
11 Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority Act (Singapore, cap 5) s 11(1)(b). 
12 I am indebted to Deirdre Moss (previously Animal Welfare Director of SPCA (Singapore)) for 
providing me with conviction statistics between 1985 and 2012, which were derived from her personal 
records. Surprisingly, these unofficial statistics appear to be more complete than those provided in the 
AVA’s annual reports. To Deirdre’s record I have added two recent cases that arose in 2013 and 2014. 
13 The AVA also issues warnings and compound fines in many cases. See Animal Welfare Legislation 
Reform Committee, above n 9, 13 and 67. See also statistics provided in the AVA’s annual reports 
(<http://www.ava.gov.sg/Publications/ListOfPublications/>). 
14  SPCA (Singapore), Annual Report: July 2011 to June 2012, 10–13 
(<http://www.spca.org.sg/pdf/SPCA%20Annual%20Report%202011-2012_low%20res.pdf>); SPCA 
(Singapore), Annual Report: July 2012 to June 2013, 14–16 
(<http://www.spca.org.sg/pdf/SPCA%20Annual%20Report%202012_13.pdf>). 
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were either found dead or in very poor conditions (injured, sick, emaciated, etc).15 
What appears to have been left out of the picture are the countless household animals 
that are improperly treated, confined or neglected by their owners but did not suffer 
obvious injury or illness (hereinafter ‘borderline cases’). In fact, such cases form a 
significant percentage of cruelty complaints received by the SPCA. Although they do 
not amount to outright abuse, the SPCA nonetheless takes a very serious view of such 
cases, considering many as sufficiently serious to warrant prosecutions.16 In contrast, 
before Hugo’s case (see below), the AVA normally refuses to prosecute in such cases.  
What, then, is the AVA’s reason(s) for refusing to prosecute in these borderline 
cases? There are two possibilities. First, although these cases fall within the definition 
of cruelty, they are not serious enough to warrant prosecution. Second, these cases do 
not fall within the definition of cruelty, in which case even the imposition of a fine is 
unwarranted. The AVA’s annual reports provide a little hint. In its 2010–11 annual 
report, for example, it was stated: ‘In FY 2010, AVA investigated 410 cases of alleged 
animal cruelty/abuse. The majority of cases did not involve animal cruelty. Instead, 
they involved welfare issues, for which counseling was provided or warnings issued’. 
Read together with the statistics set out above, one may infer that the AVA did not 
regard the borderline cases as amounting to cruelty at law.   
How, then, did the AVA arrive at such a conclusion? The concern here is that 
the question of what amounts, or may amount, to cruelty at law has not been 
sufficiently considered. There is a real likelihood that this has contributed to the 
thinking that the borderline cases could not amount to cruelty at law, which is clearly 
incorrect. As explained earlier, the animal protection laws of Singapore are sufficiently 
broad, provided of course that they are properly interpreted.  
Parts 3 and 4 below will look at two other kinds of cases to illustrate the AVA’s 
passive stance. By examining the laws applicable to these cases, it shall be shown that 
the AVA’s passive stance is indeed caused by its insufficient understanding of what 
the relevant laws are. 
 
Part 3: Improper treatment 
 
In 2009, a dog named Dimples was found chained and confined on a balcony with 
minimal shelter to the elements.17 Dimples’ snouts and front legs were also bound with 
masking tapes, resulting in abrasions. The SPCA referred the complaint to the AVA, 
expecting prosecution. To its disappointment, the AVA decided not to prosecute but 
                                                
15 For a recent case, see eg ‘Man fined $10,000 for animal cruelty’, The Straits Times (Singapore), 25 
April 2014, A8. 
16  See generally the SPCA’s annual reports, bulletins, newsletters, and etc: 
<http://www.spca.org.sg/publication.asp>. 
17  SPCA (Singapore), SPCA Bulletin, October 2009, 
5<http://www.spca.org.sg/pdf/Bulletin%20oct09.pdf>; SPCA Newsletter, January 
2010<http://www.spca.org.sg/documents/newsletterjan2010animalabuse.pdf>; SPCA (Singapore), 
‘Proposal for Legislative Reform: Recommendations to Strengthen Animal Welfare Laws in Singapore’ 
(30 December 2011), [30]<http://www.spca.org.sg/documents/spca_proposalforlegislativereform.pdf>. 
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instead imposed a composition fine. The fact that a fine was imposed implies that the 
AVA accepted that an offence has been committed. But the refusal to prosecute 
suggests a failure to appreciate the seriousness of the cruelty committed.  
 In 2010, a video recording showing a dog (named Butters) being beaten by one 
of its owners using a bundle of thin wooden sticks was uploaded onto the internet.18 
Despite considerable public outrage expressed in online forums, the AVA decided not 
to prosecute or fine the owner but instead merely issued a warning. The most 
problematic aspect of the AVA’s treatment of this case is its statement of reasons for 
not prosecuting. First, Butters was ‘healthy and in good condition’.19 Second, the 
owners had ‘no ill intention to hurt their pet dog while attempting to discipline it’ and 
therefore ‘this case was different from one of animal cruelty, which involves deliberate 
intent to inflict harm and severe pain on an animal’.20 By these statements, the AVA 
has unwittingly restricted the definition of cruelty to cases of intentional abuse causing 
severe pain and suffering. This is obviously incorrect. The cruelty offences set out in 
the ABA are clearly capable of much broader interpretations.  
 Both cases are good examples of the passive stance adopted by the AVA with 
regards to its enforcement policy. The latter case, especially, directly illustrates the 
problem highlighted in this paper. In 2013, however, the situation appeared to have 
taken a turn for the better. The landmark case concerned a dog named Hugo.21 For a 
period of over 6 months, Hugo was kept on a small balcony of its owner’s flat. The 
balcony had no proper shelter hence exposing Hugo to the elements. Hugo was seen to 
be there most of the time, day and night. A plastic pet carrier, which was not much 
larger than Hugo, was subsequently added to the balcony but this did not sufficiently 
improve Hugo’s situation. Hugo was also not provided with sufficient food and water. 
Its bowls were usually empty and on several occasions it was seen kicking and flipping 
the bowls.  
Hugo’s incessant barking attracted the attentions of several neighbours. 
Concerned about Hugo’s ordeal, they reported the matter to the SPCA, which sent an 
inspector to investigate the matter. The owner, however, did not heed the inspector’s 
advice to improve Hugo’s living condition. The SPCA then referred the matter to the 
AVA. Due to the perceived inaction of the AVA, the SPCA proceeded to lodge a 
Magistrate’s complaint.22 Eventually, the AVA took over the case and commenced 
prosecution against the owner. The Magistrates’ Court found the owner guilty under 
section 42(1)(e) of the ABA for confining Hugo in such manner as to cause it 
unnecessary suffering. A fine of $5,000 was imposed. 
                                                
18 ‘‘Dog abuse’ duo let off with stern warning’, The Straits Times (Singapore), 23 July 2010, A3. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Public Prosecutor v Ling Chung Yee Roy [2013] SGDC 252 (Singapore District Court), noted Alvin 
W-L See, ‘Milestones for Animal Welfare’ [2014] SJLS, forthcoming. 
22 SPCA (Singapore), Annual Report: July 2011 to June 2012, 10 
< http://www.spca.org.sg/pdf/SPCA%20Annual%20Report%202011-2012_low%20res.pdf>. 
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Hugo’s case is significant as certain essential points of law were clarified. First, 
the court accepted that mental suffering is relevant for the purposes of the cruelty 
offence.23 In determining whether Hugo has suffered, the court rejected the owner’s 
argument that Hugo was neither ill nor injured. Instead, the court accepted expert 
opinions that Hugo could have suffered stress due to its prolonged exposure to the 
elements.24 The prosecution’s witnesses, a number of whom are veterinarians and dog 
experts, were unanimous in their views that Hugo must have suffered in the condition 
it was kept.25 That Hugo had in fact suffered stress and frustration could be inferred 
from its incessant barking and its conduct of kicking and flipping its empty bowl.  
Importantly, this holding finally addressed one of the SPCA’s major concerns: 
 
A number of cases that have come under the SPCA’s purview have escaped 
prosecution by the Agri-Food & Veterinary Authority of Singapore (“AVA”) 
or the police precisely due to the uncertainty with respect to whether the law 
covers an animal’s mental/emotional suffering and also due to the difficulties 
of proving such mental suffering where there is no palpable physical injury.26 
 
A good example is Butters’ case noted above. Contrary to the AVA’s view, the SPCA 
argued that Butters had suffered mentally from the ordeal.27 
The second important aspect of Hugo’s case is the court’s implied acceptance of 
the objective reasonableness test. Hugo’s owner argued that he was unaware of how 
much rain and water would cause suffering to Hugo and he was also unsure what 
would constitute suffering to Hugo.28 This implicitly asserts a requirement of mens rea 
(guilty mind). Although the court did not directly address this argument, the finding of 
guilt implies that the argument was rejected. Instead, the court held that ‘any 
reasonable person would no doubt conclude that [what Hugo has experienced] 
constitutes suffering and it is unnecessary’. 29  Clearly, a reasonably caring and 
competent dog owner would not have subjected his dog to prolonged exposure to the 
elements and to deprive it of sufficient food and water.  
This approach is consistent with the English case of RSPCA v Isaacs, where the 
defendant was charged for causing unnecessary suffering to a sick and elderly dog by 
unreasonably omitting to provide it with the necessary veterinary care and attention.30 
Holland J explained that the omission would be unreasonable if, ‘viewed objectively 
… no reasonably caring, reasonably competent owner would be guilty of a similar 
                                                
23 See also Patchett v Macdougal 1983 JC 63 (Scottish High Court of Justiciary) 67, where the court 
explained that the concept of unnecessary suffering ‘imports the idea of the animal undergoing, for 
however brief a period, unnecessary pain, distress or tribulation’. 
24 Public Prosecutor v Ling Chung Yee Roy [2013] SGDC 252, [59]. 
25 Ibid [21]–[31]. 
26 SPCA (Singapore), above n 17, [14]. 
27 Ibid, [29]. 
28 Public Prosecutor v Ling Chung Yee Roy [2013] SGDC 252, [35]. 
29 Ibid, [59]. 
30 RSPCA v Isaacs (Unreported, UK High Court (QB), Mann LJ and Holland J, 12 November 1993).  
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omission’. The defendant was eventually found guilty, as the state of the dog ‘was 
plainly inconsistent with objectively reasonable care’. 
One significant implication for adopting an objective reasonableness test is that 
it implicitly rejects the requirement of mens rea, eg intention to cause suffering or 
knowledge that suffering has been caused. Animals often suffer not from intentional 
cruelty but from their owners’ negligence or indifference. Clearly, the concept of 
cruelty is wide enough to also cover such cases. To impose a requirement of mens rea 
would unduly restrict the scope of the cruelty offences, leaving many animals 
unprotected. Fortunately, the AVA’s explanation in Butters’ case with regards to the 
requirement of ‘ill intention’ is now confirmed to be incorrect. 
Given the court’s decision in Hugo’s case, one would expect that if Dimples’ 
case were brought before a court, the sentence imposed on Dimples’ owner would 
have been heavier. The AVA’s decision not to prosecute in that case is therefore 
unfortunate. Nonetheless, Hugo’s case may be seen as representing an increased 
willingness on the part of the AVA to depart from a more passive stance towards a 
more proactive approach in enforcing animal cruelty laws. This change is most warmly 
welcomed. 
 
Part 4: Unlawful killing31 
 
Unfortunately, the AVA appeared to have reverted to its usual passive stance in its 
treatment of a case in which a healthy companion animal was put to sleep. Tammy was 
a 7-month-old rescued puppy. In 2013, Tammy’s rescuer managed to find Tammy an 
adopter (hereinafter ‘owner’). But the adoption proved to be ill fated. Shortly after 
adopting Tammy, its owner complained that Tammy’s aggressive behaviour was a 
danger to her children. Tammy was eventually sent to a veterinarian to be put to sleep. 
This event caused the outrage of animal lovers, particularly Tammy’s rescuer. The 
general sentiments were that the owner’s conduct was wrongful and that Tammy 
should have been returned to its rescuer for further rehoming efforts. The veterinarian 
who put Tammy to sleep was also criticised for carrying out the procedure. 
The AVA, who was asked to look into the matter, did so but eventually decided 
not to prosecute the owner and the veterinarian. In a press release, the AVA explained 
when it is acceptable to put a healthy animal to sleep.32 The important parts are set out 
here: 
 
3 Veterinarians have a responsibility to consider not just the welfare of the pet / 
animal, but also the concerns and circumstances of the pet owner … 
                                                
31 ‘Death of ‘aggressive’ puppy draws online flak’, The Straits Times (Singapore), 15 October 2013, B7. 
32 Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority, ‘AVA explains euthanasia guidelines’ (Press Release, 22 
October 2013) <http://www.ava.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/98AEF716-C60D-48DC-B191-
46B7A7E68F7C/26948/PressRelease_AVAexplainseuthanasiaguidelines.pdf >. 
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Veterinarians … may at times be called upon to euthanize an animal for various 
reasons, such as to alleviate their suffering, or if they are aggressive … 
 
4 … Before euthanizing an animal, the veterinarian will conduct the necessary 
professional assessment and satisfy himself that euthanasia is a reasonable 
option considering the circumstances. The veterinarian will ascertain ownership 
of the animal and discuss with the owner the various options available so that 
the owner can make the final informed decision. The decision, however, is 
ultimately the responsibility and right of pet owner. In advising the owner, the 
veterinarian, has to also be mindful of the implications of not acceding to a 
request for an aggressive pet to be euthanized, such as the client’s potential 
distress and safety threats to the owner, his/her family, another unknowing 
adopter or the general public.  
 
The AVA found that the veterinarian had followed the standard protocols in dealing 
with the owner’s request to put Tammy to sleep. The AVA was also convinced, based 
on the veterinarian’s statement of experience with Tammy, that Tammy was 
aggressive. Lastly, the AVA also took into account the fact that the owner ‘had 
considered alternatives such as re-homing her pet before deciding to have her dog 
euthanised’. Unfortunately, the AVA appeared to have given no consideration at all 
about the laws applicable to this case, which would dictate the relevant factual 
inquiries necessary to determine the legality of putting Tammy to sleep. 
The general rule appears to be that unless authorised by law, the killing of an 
animal amounts to an offence under section 428 of the PC. There are a number of 
instances where the killing of an animal is authorised by law. An example is the killing 
of animals for food carried out in a licensed slaughterhouse.33 Another example is 
authorised euthanasia. The power to euthanise an animal is found in the ABA itself. 
Under section 44, the court may, upon convicting a person for cruelty, order that the 
animal be destroyed if it is satisfied that the animal is ‘incurably diseased or injured’. 
Similarly, section 45 allows an authorised officer or police officer to order the 
destruction of an animal if he is satisfied that:  
 
(a) [the] animal is diseased or injured and that the disease or injury from which 
the animal is suffering is incurable or that it is cruel to keep the animal alive; or 
(b) [the] animal is so diseased or so severely injured or in such a physical 
condition that, in his opinion, having regard to the means available for removing 
the animal there is no possibility of removing it without cruelty and that it is 
cruel to keep it alive.  
 
                                                
33 See Wholesome Meat and Fish Act (Singapore, cap 349A, 2002 rev ed). 
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Clearly, under these two sections, the power to euthanise an animal is vested only in 
the courts and authorised public officers. Furthermore, the power could only be 
exercised in very specific situations for the benefit of the animals. Tammy’s case does 
not fall within any of these exceptional instances where killing of an animal is 
authorised by law. 
 Tammy’s case, however, is less straightforward because there were two parties 
involved: the owner and the veterinarian. The owner did not kill Tammy herself but 
instead procured its killing by the veterinarian. It is convenient to first deal with the 
legality of the veterinarian’s action. The AVA recognised that it is acceptable in 
certain situations for veterinarians to put animals to sleep. It even laid down standard 
protocols to be adhered to by veterinarians in dealing with requests by owners to put 
their animals to sleep. But there is in fact no law that authorises this. Of course, society 
generally finds it acceptable to euthanise an incurably ill animal to relieve its suffering. 
And no person has ever been prosecuted for doing so. Faced with an unintended gap, 
the law turns a blind eye, and sensibly so. But Tammy’s case is not a case of 
euthanasia for Tammy was a healthy animal. It would appear that, in theory at least, 
section 428 of the PC applies to the veterinarian’s act of killing Tammy. In practice, 
however, compliance with the AVA’s standard protocols is likely to be a valid a 
defence. 
 Regardless of whether the veterinarian has committed an offence, Tammy’s 
owner could be liable for an offence of abetment by instigation,34 which includes the 
abetment of ‘an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by 
law of committing an offence …’35 Since Tammy’s owner has abetted an act (the 
killing of Tammy) which would amount to an offence (under section 428 of the PC) if 
carried out by a person having no defence, the offence of abetment is made out. The 
penalty for abetment is the same as the penalty for the offence abetted.36  
 Having established an offence on the part of Tammy’s owner, the important 
question is whether she could avail herself of any defence? Based on her reason for 
putting Tammy to sleep, a relevant provision is section 81 of the PC, which sets out 
the defence of necessity: 
 
Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge 
that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to 
cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other 
harm to person or property [emphasis added]. 
 
Where the defence is argued on the basis that the killing of the animal will avoid some 
greater harm (ie based on justificatory necessity), an implicit requirement is the 
                                                
34 See Penal Code (Singapore, cap 224, 2008 rev ed) ch V. 
35 Ibid, s 108. See also Explanation 3: ‘[i]t is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by 
law of committing an offence …’. 
36 Ibid, s 109. 
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proportionality between the defendant’s response and the threatened harm.37 This 
requirement finds support from the Explanation that accompanies the section:  
 
It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or 
avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of 
doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm.38 
 
Even if the threatened harm is of such a nature as to justify the commission of an 
offence to prevent it, the defendant’s response must be reasonably necessary.39 It is 
suggested that in deciding whether these requirements are satisfied, an objective test is 
applied. Again, a hypothetical reasonable person is called upon to determine the issue.  
  It is difficult to decide if the defence of necessity applies in Tammy’s case 
without the benefit of full facts, which are best determined in a full trial. However, it is 
not unfair to say that the owner’s arguments raise some curious points. Could a 7-
month-old puppy pose such a threat to human safety so as to justify putting it to sleep? 
Even if such aggressiveness is found to be true, is the owner’s decision to put her to 
sleep a reasonably necessary response? It is arguable that a reasonable person in the 
owner’s position would have chose to return Tammy to her rescuer instead of putting 
her to sleep. Tammy’s rescuer, it seemed, would have taken Tammy back, especially if 
made known that the alternative was to put Tammy to sleep.  
Based on the above discussion of the law, it is clear that the AVA was incorrect 
in saying that the decision to put down an animal is ultimately the right of its owner. 
While animals are capable of being the subject of legal ownership, the law has 
accepted that animals are a special kind of property deserving protection.40 Thus, while 
an owner of defective goods is free to throw it away or destroy it, he cannot do the 
same to an animal that he owns. The owner’s freedom to deal with the animal, a living 
property, is necessarily constrained by law.  
Lastly, on a separate but related note, one cannot help but wonder how the 
AVA’s treatment of Tammy’s case is consistent with its ‘Responsible Pet Ownership’ 
programme which, ironically, carries the message (among others) ‘A pet is a lifetime 
commitment’.41 The AVA claims to have been ‘actively promoting responsible pet 
ownership to equip existing and potential owners with knowledge on the care and 
responsibility that comes with owning a pet’. A potential animal owner is surely 
expected to understand the responsibilities and risks inherent in owning an animal. It is 
unrealistic to expect all newly acquired animals to be trouble-free. Many animals come 
                                                
37 See Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore 
(Lexis Nexis, 2nd ed, 2012) 664–65. 
38 See also Illustrations (a) and (b) to s 81. 
39 Yeo, Morgan & Chan, above n 37, 666–67. 
40 See David Favre, ‘Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal System’ (2010) 93 
Marquette L Rev 1021. 
41Agri-Food & Veterinary Authority  
<http://www.ava.gov.sg/AnimalsPetSector/ResponsiblePetOwnership>. 
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to their new owners with some behavioral issues due to young age or past negative 
experiences. With proper care and training, the animal will most likely improve in its 
interaction with humans. Bonds and trusts are to be forged with time and effort. These 
are surely the basic expectations and responsibilities that the said programme seeks to 
instill in animal owners. It is crucial that the AVA start sending real signals that 
irresponsible pet ownership would attract legal consequences. 
 
Part 5: The relevance of public opinion 
 
The AVA has on several occasions justified its decision not to prosecute by saying that 
the complained conducts do not amount to cruelty. Given that these complained 
conducts often attract public outrage and disapproval, it is interesting to ask if public 
opinion has any role to play in determining the legality of these conducts.  
It is of course incorrect to suggest that judges and enforcement agencies must 
always follow public opinion. Often, legal provisions are worded in such a way that 
leaves no room for reference to public opinion. However, where the law explicitly 
adopts an objective test or is properly interpreted to have done so, such as for the 
offences under the ABA and the defence of necessity under the PC, public opinion is a 
necessary consideration. As explained earlier, an objective test relies on a hypothetical 
reasonable person to determine the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. The 
attributes of this hypothetical person are necessarily informed by society’s attitude 
towards the issue in question. In this sense, one may say that it is a legal requirement 
to take into account public opinion in determining issues of animal cruelty. 
Admittedly, public opinion is not always collectively held. Not every person 
would have directed his or her mind to the issue of animal cruelty. There are also 
persons who are aware of this issue but deem it unimportant. The same problem arises 
for all moral issues, and yet the use of objective test remains prevalent in the common 
law (especially in the law of torts). The solution, it is suggested, is simply to focus on 
the opinions of persons who are genuinely concerned about the matter. 
 The ability to accommodate public opinion is one of the main reasons why the 
animal protection laws of Singapore have withstood the test of time. As society 
progresses and moral values change, what was previously regarded as reasonable 
infliction of suffering may now be regarded as cruelty.42 To ensure that this advantage 
is not lost in practice, the AVA is implored, in so far as is reasonable, to align its 
definition of cruelty with public opinion. 
 
Part 6: The importance of prosecution 
 
Prosecution serves many important functions. An obvious one is its deterrence effect. 
Unlike compound fines and warnings, which appear to be the AVA’s preferred 
                                                
42 Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 2 (Butterworths, 4th ed Reissue, 1991) [407]. 
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enforcement methods, prosecution carries the possibility of an imprisonment sentence 
upon conviction. This serves as a very powerful deterrent in light of the social stigma 
associated with imprisonment.  
 More importantly, as a substantial portion of animal law is rooted in criminal 
law, the main method by which formal adjudication by a court could be sought is 
through the commencement of prosecution.43 Administered by personnel specifically 
trained in the law, the courts are in a better position to resolve difficult or unclear legal 
issues. There are good examples. In R v Banjoor, the court interpreted the word ‘ill-
treatment’ found in the predecessor of section 42(1)(a) of the ABA as being wide 
enough to include cruelty by omission.44 In Crane v Paglar, the court held that for the 
secondary offence of procuring, assisting or permitting cruelty to an animal, it is a 
legal requirement that the defendant has knowledge of the cruelty, although the 
statutory wording was silent.45 More recently, in PP v Ling Chung Yee Roy (Hugo’s 
case), the court has laid many uncertainties to rest, taking a wide view of what 
amounts to animal cruelty at law. The decision not to prosecute in Tammy’s case 
represents a missed opportunity to seek the court’s clarification on the legality of 
putting a healthy animal to sleep. 
 The problem faced by Singapore is best described as involving a vicious cycle. 
The low number of prosecutions has resulted in few cases being put before a court. 
This deprives the courts of the opportunities to address the substantive elements of 
animal law. This contributes to the insufficient understanding of animal law, which in 
turn leads to the formulation of an unsound enforcement policy. It is suggested that 
where there is doubt as to the correct interpretation of the law, and especially where 
the public has expressed strong disapproval over the complained conduct, the case is 
best put before a court for consideration. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The AVA’s approach to the issue of animal cruelty and its prosecution policy clearly 
lack consistency. This paper has argued that one important cause is the AVA’s 
insufficient understanding of what amounts to cruelty at law, particularly the failure to 
appreciate that where the law adopts an objective test, public opinion is a necessary 
consideration. It is crucial that this error is recognised and rectified. Otherwise, the 
same problem will haunt the animal welfare provision that will soon be added to the 
ABA, rendering it less effective than intended. The contribution of this paper is merely 
to stress the importance of the study and development of animal law as these have a 
                                                
43 An alternative method is the making of a complaint to a Magistrate: Criminal Procedure Code 
(Singapore, cap 68) s 151. 
44 [1930] Straits Settlements LR 31 (Straits Settlements Supreme Court): ‘I have not the slightest doubt 
in my mind that ill-treatment can occur by omission as well as by action. If a woman suffers her child to 
die for want of feeding, who on earth could say she had not ill treated the child? And so with the owner 
of an animal’ (Murison CJ). 
45 [1888] 1 Straits LJ 72 (Straits Settlements Supreme Court). 
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direct impact on the extent to which animals are actually protected. Ultimately, it is 
only through the cooperation of all stakeholders that the efforts to protect animals have 
any real hope of success.  
